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(successor to PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS and LOAN ASSOCIATION),
Defendant and Appellee.
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feqph Palmer
fcLE & DRAPER
^EastFourth South #900
*LakeCity,UT84111
||tien Tingey & Elaina M. Maragakis
^ *, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
LYNN P. HEWARD - A1479
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4252 South 700 East
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants

LIST OF PARTIES
The above caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding
in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed. However, Nancy Madsen is the
only surviving named representative plaintiff, and Washington Mutual Bank is the only
surviving defendant, being the successor in interest to Prudential.
Throughout this brief, plaintiffs and appellants will be referred to as "Madsen,"
and defendant and appellee will be referred to as "Prudential."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PRIJDENTIAL^S ARGUMENTS ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS MUST FAIL
Prudential argues that Madsen has no claim because feudal regu.aih ;,
a l l l L l l l l l ' i l o i 11)11 M ' S l "

Pllllll llllill ,

S ill

"'

• >'

;M \ iu,.:

!•:*:>*

field." (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant a l p . >+ *s.j However, .Prudential^
argument on federal regulations must fail.
A. Utah Supreme Court
V\ hen this c ase • * as before the I Jtah Si lpreme C()i ir (:., I h i i (iei itiaFs a ppella te bi ief
argued:
A n e w regulation was promulgated b y the Federal H o m e Loan
Bank Board on June 16, 1975 to prescribe the circumstances under
which federal savings and loan associations, such as defendant, m a y
pay interest on escrows. It provides (12 C F.R ., §545.6-11 (c)):
Except as provided by contract, a Federal associate n
shall have no obligation to p a y interest on escrow
accounts apart from the duties imposed b y this
paragraph, (Emphasis from Prudential appellate brief.)
One of the main purposes of federal regulation of federal savings and
loan associations is to protect the federal agency in its acquisition of
mortgages and related notes from the federal savings and loan
associations. Thus, great deference should be given to the federal
regulations and the cases which interpret them in determining
whether plaintiffs have a claim against defendant. Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Those regulations all imply that plaintiffs'
claim is unfounded. Brief of Respondent, Utah Supreme Court,
Sept. 2, 1976, at 4, 5 and I ? -} ; ~ ^ n" ni.

1

In suiTinlaiy, Prudential's federal theory has already been presented to the Utah
Supreme Court It is not necessary that federal questions to be decided by a federal court.
Federal questions can just as well be decided by a state court: "It must be remembered that
when ii'iliMiil ifiii1 Jinn , m
. i iM1 in i iiuscs pending in -link* t nulls IIIUM1 i nutls ni» (R'tftrfly
competent to decide them, and it is their duty to do so. Chandler v. O 'Bryan, 445 F.2d
1045, 1057-8 (10th Cii 1971) If 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-• •.' ^ destroyed Madsen's cause of
action, the Utah Supreme Court would ii,.vc been \o\\ ^ -> alhrm the ti ial court's
disi nissal o" ei 11
: riit) ;; 'eai s ago.1
B. I 'he I ei ith Circuit Court of Appeals
After Prudential lost in state court {% A above), Prudential filed a separate action
for declaratory relief in federal court i u Rderal trial i^-urt ruk\ i. \,t ^- o Prudential
and Madsen appealed

I hi is,

• •

* \

.

;

:

'h

Pnidenl • " s federal defenses. See Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Ass% (or Madsen II) 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980). "\\\ spouse to these federal
defenses, the Tenth Circuit held in this very case that:
i iere, n . - .:;WU»U.M\ argued that application of state law Wwu-.,
create a significant conflict because federal policy requires unilorm
nationwide standards for the handling of escrow accounts by federal
savings and loan associations. This argument founders on 'he very
language of the regulation cited to support it. Section 545.6-1 \ u)
it makes no difference that the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Madsen v.
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass''n, (or Madsen I) 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977)
does not specifically discuss federal questions. See Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930).
2

provides that a federal savings and loan association shall pay interest
on escrow accounts if a state statute requires such payments to be
made by state-chartered institutions, or if payments are required by
contract, rh regulation expressly anticipates that the obligation of a
federal institution to pay interest on escrow accounts not only will
vary from state to state, but from contract to contract. . . . Any
argument that federal policy requires nationwide uniformity with
regard to this issue is untenable.

Given the absence of a significant conflict between the federal polic)
expressed in section 545.6-11 (c) and the use of state law, we hold
that state law is applicable in determining whethei Prudential
contracted to pay interest on the Madsens' escrow account.
(Emphasis added.) Mads en 11, 635 F,2d at 802 and 803.
In . .
Pri identia 1's ffeclc •

ii \ 11 it Tcnlli ( 'in in! t "iiiiirl ol Appeals lias squan/lv ruled ;uMins1
1 offenses.

POINT II
PRUDENTIAL HAS NOT PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE
(SO-CALLED) SPECIAL AGREEMENT
Madsen I slates the following.
[W Jhen the propei ty piuigud iso:suji,i character as not to be
lessened by use, the pledgee does not incur liability by using it; but if
from the use of it profits are derived, pledgee must, in the absence of
a special agreement, account for them to the pledgor.
(Emphasis added.) Madsen I, 558 P.2d 1337,, 1340.
Prudential's Brief argues lh.il llr lii.nl i mill
. .. improperly excluded the mii-dik WO\ .»f'evidence of a "special
agreement" between Prudential and Mad^ns. (Lmphasis added.)
Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellani at 18.

3

However, Prudential did ilot plead any affirmative defense of a "special
agreement." Furthermore, there is no "offer t>f proof Y; 'he record of what the "special
agreement" inijjjil he 'I In onl\ "oiler oi pro* ; - .. ,ms issue seems to ht !lu lull v .ij;.
II 11 1'ii In nil H I M Piudi'iitLit'i

1 n lake the offer of proof because we contend that there are a number
of additional issues in the case beyond the question of profit.
I'd be glad to detail those issues. There are at least 24
of them.
And in the interest of time I'll spare you ai gumem ,s> u« *\,.u
contend those additional issues are Trial Trans^-^i ^cv\ T
at 278-9 (See Ex ^ )
The offer of proof quoted above is clearly too vague and ambiguous to preserve anything.
Prudential also cites an Order dated September 3, 1985 (R. 2029-31) to show that
the "special contract" issue was properly preserved A. L:»

.

put tl lat Order was

never sigutd. (Sec t7x i« i nil IIL iniph hi/nrn HHirh, imi mi unsigned \ >rdci m 4HJW that
arl l s s u e w a s

preserved.

Finally, a "special agreement" would, by definition, be an "express contract." See?
Fitzpatrickv.

Vermont

State Treasurer,

I • #•- 4 \\

iM, I < > A.J.d \^ *4, iu< » \ \i>^A):

Although the term "special agreement" has not been defined,
the term "special contract" has been defined as one with peculiar
provisions or stipulations not found in the ordinary contract relating
to the same subject matter, and which, if omitted, the law will i: lot
supply. , . A special contract is always an express contract,
that
is, one whose provisions are expressed and not dependent on
:icatinr
A, special agreement, as contemplated in 3 V ,S.A.
§ 455(a)(9), may therefore be defined as one containing express
provisions not foiiir4 :" *H ordinary agreement relating to the
4

employment of state employees, which provisions, if omitted, the law
will not supply. (Emphasis added.)
In summary; Prudential's "special agreement" argument must fail because
Prudential has failed t o o I k i e u d c i u v »>l »in\ Vxpiri'M pio\ ismns" j>ivim» Pnulnitial
•'••;-•*

Hedged funds.

POINT III
CLASS CERTIFICATION P U R S U A N T TO R U L E 23 flb)(l)(A) W A S P R O P E R
Prudential argues that the class was improperU . e; i:: ie
response tc lli.il jrgumeiil is lli.il llu 1 "l.tli Siipin

.; .
'

" • • A~\ jase that:

Notwithstanding Prudentiars assertions, this case has a
precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of Prudential borrowers
whose trust deeds contain language identical to the Madsen trust
deed. The class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977. Madsen i\
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass% (or Madsen III) 767 P 2d
538, 547 (Utah 1988). .
Ii

lion OIIJ Supreme Tom i ilnl mil ii i .UP, piohlniis tulh elass certification when that

issue was reviewed in 1988.
Prudential cites several older cases to argue that certification under Rule
' *• •

. .v-v.-t

the recent case oi An, /;. '/

1

1 nvever, the scope of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is best described by
uith As Im

1/ indsoi

. " I I l ,' „, v i l

u I i I ! "' S ( I

138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), which states in part:
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) "takes in cases where the party is obligated by law
to treat the members of the class alike (a utility acting towards
customers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party must
treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity (a riparian owner
using water as against downriver owners)," (Citations omitted )

5

)

" >' I

:

because all class members

•

v t« l i e i

-.

signed an identical contract

m h e ^ of the class alike"

See Madsen I.

Indeed, Prudential has a legal duty to treat all class members alike because

Sre Wrshrn

Struritirs

Co v Sihrr

King Consol

Miwrig Co., S7 I Huh KK,I( 192 P. 664,

674(1920):
Under the law, therefore, appellant was entitled to the dividends that
were declared on the stock during the time it remained in pledge, and
it necessarily follows that it received such dividends as a trustee for
the benefit of the pledgor of the stock, and was bound to account for
them, and to credit the amount of the dividends upon the debt to
secure which the stock was pledged. (Emphasis added
The instant case is similar to the case of Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 63 F.R.D. 34 (D.S.D. 1974). In that case, the class action was brought on
behalf c If agi oup oi i c • :)IIII:ISI it nei s \ \ ho v\ -ei e all o ei cl mi ge d I:))
c .oi n 11 le Id tha t the resoh ition of the dispute "v\ "oi ild reqi lire some kind of distribution plan,
and that a number of adjudications would present the risk of a number of different
distribution plans. Thus, the court held that the class would b e maintainable under

:F R 1) 356 (IS 1 D Ga 1985)
As the Supreme Court of California has stated:
:i

"When either subsection (b)(l
(b)(3) should not be used, so as to avoid unnecessary inconsistencies and compromises in
future litigation." DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995).
6

[Controversies involving widely used contracts of adhesion present
ideal cases for class adjudication; the contracts aire uniform, the same
principles of interpretation apply to each contract, and all members of
the class will share a common interest in the interpretation of an
agreement to which each is a party. Discover Bank v. Superior
. Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, **<> r •' P i ^ ^ ^ i n P M i loo \ 106
(2005),
In "short, many state and federal cases, with similar fact patterns have been certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A).
1 .nailv. ri uu.-.i^a: has argued mat L.. - ..
it" 'I huik/nlul is «ontr|
:

Lf Prudential

..*

: i i e d 1: } c €i tif) ing this • :ase as a
J

-\c ligation. Rather, the contrary

is correct, those who were former class members have the right to

start all over again. See American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 1,:» 7, *u2
(Utah 1992).
We agree Wim mc; icdeuu interpretations and conclude as a matter of
Utah law that when a proper appeal of a class certification decision is
taken, the tolling benefit continues on behalf of all members of the
class until the class issue is finally determined by the decision on
appeal.
In summary, if this Court conclude* ihui. class cluneal.on was inp^y. .
simply opens itim, floodgates li>r some 10 000 1 Hah f;miilirs In Mr brand new individual
- • r ' Hah . ^jris.
P'uduniiai argues nun, ouici ^IILSS member m puium *• class Midline]-; au not
interested in this lawsuit because no one else has filed a similar or companion lawsuits,
But, perhaps, other class members have not filed companion lawsuits simply because they
have seen the many newspaper articles about the instant {Madsen) case; and they believe
that they just need to wait for this lawsuit to end and, as members of the certified class,
they will automatically collect. Also, class member were falsely told that their pledged
7

Generally, a trial court order granting class certification is reviewed "under an abuse
of discretion standard. See, e.g., Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 323
F.3d 32, *
I ill lil

>(• i . w\
"i

i

, ,,
'(Mill ,

t'usL csj w/i1/,,,-. <\.,i. nor/^...^;

ttzrr,

•. •

II M I -M. .,,,r /', , ',,, < //iiv,,,-, ^' 1 \\ \ , V> ^KS

SJE.2d52, M (2003).
P O I N T IV
T H E SIX YEAR STATUTE O F L I M I T A T I O N S
IVfadsen has argued tl lat tl lei e is no statute of lin litations foi tl lis ca se (See I >oint V
bel :) * ) 1 lo < a e \ ru. If a i 13 stati ite • : f ITII: it lita tions applies, it would be the six-year statute.
(Madsen's opening Brief at Point lil.j The six-year statute of limitations at issue (78-1.223) states:
An action may bi 'M ught within six yeuis . , upon any conluul,
obligation, orliabihh I'onndod lipnn im iiisliiimi'iil in writing , .
(Emphasis added )
Madsen's opening Brief then compared the statute of limitations, as quoted above,
a ith the mandate of our Supreme Court, in Mads en Iy which states:
This action is founded on a deed of ti i 1st and was brougl it to
determine the , . . legal consequences ip : 1 1 .1 sr L .ant to such
terms (En: lphasis added) Madsen 1 558 P 2 i at 1338.

-funds were placed in a "1 ion-interest bearing account.5'' (See pp.. 14, 15, below ) Class
members would have little or no reason to file individual lawsuits if their pledged funds
were truly in a "non-interest bearing" account.
8

Thus the argument boils down to this:
A..

According to the mandate in Mads en /, the Madsen lawsuit is:
4b
FOUNDED ON A [WRITTEN] DEED OF T R l - ^ "

B.

The six-year statute of limitations applies if the lawsu.. "FOUNDED ON A N INSTRUMENT IN WRITING

1 i0 STATU

•: - : 1ITATIONS

Madsen's opening Brief argued that there is no statute of limitations for money
'deposited'" in a bank. Madsen' s opening BIN (Turfhei aigiius Dial he iiiaiuLtk <»( llm
Si ip] < :;n i€ Cc in n I ir "I' it idsi rn It established 1 he facttha tMa dsen's pledge was a type of
"deposit," and, therefore, no statute of limitations would apply,4 Specifically, Madsen's
brief relied upon the following language from Madsen I:
A deposit of money as security jui ihc \K::> *i..:a\.^z oi u . - m u ^ ^
been recognized as a vn'id plcdiv. =Fm: --JSI-- added.> h./f::dsi",n

A gain, Prudential attempts to sidestep the issue. Prudential argues that:
The passage cited by Madsen merely states that money can be
pledged as a security. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at pp.
25-26.
4

0n pages 10 11 of its opening brief. Prudential quotes the case summary
published at the beginning of Madsen /, asserting that this case summary was actually
prepared by the Utah Supreme Court. However, see West Publishing Co, v. Mead Data
Central Inc., 799 R2d 1219, 1221-22 (8th Cir. 1986), which states that it is the West
Company (not the court) that adds headnotes and a "synopsis" to each opinion in its
reporter system. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi did not rely on the case
summary when it recognized that Madsen /held that a pledgee must account to the
pledgor for profits accruing from the pledge. Murray < Payne, 437 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss.
1983).
9

However, Prudential's interpretation is totally frivolous. If our Supreme Court had
wanted to say; "money can be pledged as a security/' our Supreme Court would have
simply written ''money can be pledged as a seci nt it) ."
P a tl ici , tl ie issi ic in h fat is en I was whether Madsen's nioi ithly payment to the bank
should be defined as a pledge. Our Supreme Court held inter alia that:
A deposit of money [such as Madsen's monthly payment] for the
performance of a contract [such as the Trust Deed] has been
recognized as a \-M\A pledge. (Emphasis added.) •'•/.'*• " ' • x
at 1339

'1

The case of Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208 (1901) is
in accord:
While the fund was deposited in the bank for a special purposes, it
was still a deposit within the meaning of section 3154 [predecessor
to § 78-12-34]. . . and there was no limitation of time in which an
action to recover it should be commenced 65 P. at 211.
See also Ellis v. Roberts, 98 Pa. Super. 49, 57 (1929) (A deposit is "[a]nything given as a
pledge"); Lawrence v I K Parlier Estate Co„y 92 P.2d 917, 920 (Cal. A pp "QQQ) ("A
pledge is a depos.. . ^wrter Oxford English Dictionary (Fiftl i. Ed 2002) (<: 'deposit: : V

contract").
Indeed, the trial court has already reached the following Finding of Fact:
I Jpon receiving each monthly payment, Prudential irnmeu-au;/
deposited the entire check into its general operating account,
(Emphasis added.) (Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law ,
Finding No 5 R 2998.)
•

Finally, Madsen's opening Brief also relied upon the case of Conner v. Smith, 51
ah 129, 160 V 1 ^

160 (1917) which states:

yyrj^eT1 propcjiy is nciu .
that he holds it a/K !>^" '
to it under th? r

;u a* .^tui n \. m ^auiwA desert
-l"or <md then4w arnnire a ri^ht

Prudential argues that the language in Conner, above,, is only dicia, which >houuj
^ J < w :.an

be ignored by this Court. However, the case of State v. Menzies, 889 r.-ld ^y

v criicai stare decisis, L;IC I'HM O; ihese two facets, compels a C^L*I :
follow strictly the decisions rendered, by a higher court..
• i. _
this mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the holding of a
higher court, as well as any "judicial dicta" that may be announced.
by the higher court, [citations omitted,.]
Tn summary, this con,, . . M U R I ; . former v ., :..*.. .

A A A-.^ .JIU:L*:.-.'

POINT VI
DAMAGE CLAIMS AFTER 1979
,-l. \v

i / - 4 U . t . A , (Miiy dpiMiC-h u> Lt^liOHb liiCu a l l ^ l J a n u a r y i . t -; • .-

As described in Madsen's opening Brief, Madsen took out a home loan in 1964.
j

)e duration of the loan was 25 years (or until 1989) and,. M'adsen paid pledged, funds for

each of those 25 years. Therefore, Madsen seeks damages 1oi me pci i* -u v ; . —
Ho\ vever, the ti ial coi n 1: cut off dam. .'• • •

• *
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:H.VII^

.: - *. <

^.JIUUMUII -.M

L a w 1i > sLiics.

l|

him-H't^ ^qniiunr mi IIIIIIIC in, I >7C> h\ reason of Utah Code Ann. § 7-

17.4 " ( \L 3002.) ••'

i ;" 4 is included in Exhibit J to Madsen's opening Brief.)

Madsen claims that § 7-17-4 ca.nnot apply to this case because § ' I ' I' If." 1 nl the
same Act states;
1'hr pro* "sions i>l this acl shall apply . , . </"') lo all actions filed after
Piiiiiuiil 1, P)1^

(Emphasis added.)

And, of course, the instant action was filed in 19^5, four years before January 1, 1979.
Prudential's Brief totally fails to address the above argument, v \ , j ' . ; . ».
l

response to ah - ...-. U J I M .^ L j;y, exclusive]) \ on
"1 "he pi o"

;

'

1 '

-* 1)

^'-!r

to ail reserve accounts."

Of course, i r -^-l 7-10(1; ("shall apply , ,

_-Jl reserve accounts'" :- inconsistent

with § 7-17-10(2) ("shall apply . . . to all action filed after January 1, I{) /9) The i.ourt
must then resort, to Nelson v. ,>^. ,,L,„, ; ^ ; , . , .

- -

* .. *

'

Clearly the first and last sentences of [the statutes] are patently
inconsistent
This court will not construe a statute in such a way
as to render certain, \ iable parts meaningless and void.
*

sf:

jfc

1 b choose which statement controls uvci mc WUWK WUUIU an • ^
legislation by judicial fiat . . Accordingly, the power to rev - J
that ipr-iy-ii'V-niK ]*<-.: \ • \,\\- M)e province of our legislature.
Prudential's Brief was totally silent on the Nelson case, above.
Since § 7-17-1, et seq., does not apply to actions filed before its enactment the
following subsections (B-F) referring to 11 I •«ml atute are acadei nic.
1 o

B I "he Nixon case docs not apply to this case.
Prudential's Brief (p > • 0 states that the case of Nixon v American Savings & Loan
Assn., 635 P.2d24 (Utah. 19K -Mils Huu ihc SLUUIC (v .

•

-.JA^

case.
In Nixon, the plaintiffs filed an action after the statute was enacted, and plaintiffs
sought a statutory remedy. In the instant case. Madsci, inuj a,: action before the statute
was enacted, seeking a cony -

common l.i'i'i reinah

hiilhtTiiiore, a

•• ••:

§ 7 1 3 10( 1),, the stati :i te cannot applj I: : this Madsen case. (See subsection A abovc, ,i\
short, all of the legal conclusions in Nixon relate to and interpret a statute. All ^f the legal
claims in the instant case relate to and interpret a contract..
C. 9 /-1 -4 et. scq. does not apply to claims mi pmnb
/

i •

.

+t i -r^os after 191? oy

reason «** ; n-i 7-4 u.v^.A. % , i7-4, Utah Code Ann. slates m part:
(a) The borrower may elect to .maintain a non-interest-bearing
reserve account to be serviced, by the lender at no charge to
the borrower; (Emphasis added.)
• Pi irsuaiit to the foregoing statutes, Pri :i dential sent out a form letter to its
customers. (R. 3007.) That form letter states in part:
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in
your loan documents to be deposited in a non interest bearing reserve
account. We will continue to provide you the service of paying your

1.3

y u i v -a\es and/or insuiancc premiums at not cost as they become
uut, or, i ['Emphasis added v I v. JJV ,.
As noted, above,, the statute and the form letter sent out by Prudential both relate
exclusive!) ;*. ;; t^.v ,
M»M1M I

.owever, tins Lnvsiiil Isis, inn! lining lo d

\ illllli 'iinitHiivsl "' 'Rallini

: inn" loi u|iiiMii(il'" \i In! Ii Pnid^nliril h;»s earned by sea etly investing the

pledged funds. If the legislature had wanted the statute to deal with "profits," it could
easily have done so.
L). Deposited, into "non interest bearing accoui it"
A- n-ted iri si lbsectioi i C, a be s, 1 :illi i identia 1 sc i it tl ne follow ingform letter to all of
its mortgage customers:
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in your
loan document to be deposited in a non interest bearing . . . account,
(Emphasis added ) (R 3007 )
Huwcu i Midst in li.is Mijuinl ih.il IVinlnin.il did not dcposi! tIn ptcxlpt: payments
into a "non interest bearing" account as promised by Prudential's letter. Madsen
supported this argument with the Affidavit of Andrew Can* Conway.5
Prudential did not deposit the funds designated for taxes and
insurance within Madsen'^ monthly payments into a "non-ink re cf
bearing reserve'!'• "0' ,MI
" Briel of Appellam ,*1 i~ ^
Prudential gives two pages of accounting conclusions why the Conway affidavit
should be disregarded. However,, Pruderitiars attorneys are not accountants (nor are the
5

IV,!. v wiiv.ay is a Certified Fraud Ex an n - a , J t. .rtified Financial Investigator,
and a Certified Public Accountant, with thirty years of experience with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. (R. 11883-4.)
I Il

judges of this court accountants). The only expert testimony on this issue is from Mr.
Conway. This court should ignore the attempts of Prudential's attorneys to give
accounting testimony and accounting conclusions. See e.g., Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC
Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 280-281 (5th Cir. 1987).
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical
meaning when the contract involves a technical matter.
. . . [I]n this case, the admission of the expert testimony of
individuals experienced in the oil and gas accounting field for the
purpose of obtaining explanation of the technical meanings of terms
used in the net profits accounting provisions of the Farmout seems
prudent.
See also Coastal Georgia Regional Development Center v. Higdon, 263 Ga. 927, 439
S.E.2d 902 (1994).
E. Form letter sent "pursuant to this Chapter" [§ 7-17-4(2) U.C.A.]
Subsections C and D above discuss a form letter which Prudential sent out to
customers in June of 1979. Prudential claims that the form letter cut-off6 all damage
claims after June 30, 1979. Madsen's opening Brief argued that the letter could not cut
off damages because the letter did not state that it was sent out "pursuant to this chapter"
[of the new statute] as required by § 7-17-4(2) U.C.A.7 (Compare Brief of Appellant at p.
18.) However, Prudential argues that it has satisfied the statutory requirement (to advise
6

That entire form letter is reprinted at p. 14 of Madsen's opening Brief (R. 3007.)

7

§ 7-17-4(2) U.C.A. states: "the notice required by this Subsection 2 shall...
clearly . . . state t h a t . . . the notice is being given pursuant to this chapter." (Emphasis
added.)
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customers that the letter was sent "pursuant to this Act") by including the following
language at the bottom of the letter:
While Prudential is governed by Federal and not State Law in matters
dealing with the terms of a loan contract, the options as set forth
herein are consistent with the provisions of Utah Law . (R. 3007.)
(Emphasis added.)
Prudential's argument is so frivolous that no detailed response is necessary. It was
the obvious intent of the legislature that customers who received the form letter could read
the actual statute if they wanted more information on the fonn letter which they had just
received. But, the Prudential fonn letter simply stated that the letter was "consistent with
the provisions of Utah law." Thus, customers receiving the Prudential letter would have
had to read all the "provisions of Utah law" if they wanted more infonnation. Of course
that is absurd.8
The case of Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762, is on
point. The issue in Longley was whether the state had given proper statutory notice in a
water rights case. Our Supreme Court ruled:
8

Prudential argued that the statute was not yet codified. But even if the statute
was not codified, the Prudential form letter could have referred to Senate Bill 85 as was
the case in Nixon v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 635 P.2d 24 (Utah 1981). It would
have been fairly easy for Prudential customers to get copies of Senate Bill 85 if they
wanted more background information. But it would have been virtually impossible for
customers of Prudential to read all of "Utah law" if they wanted more information.
Further, Prudential never presented any evidence that Senate Bill 85 had not been
codified when the Prudential form letter was sent out in June of 1979. Prudential
cites R. 11105-07 as proof that Senate Bill 85 had not been codified. However,
Prudential's cite to the record (R. 11105-07) merely refers to Prudential's own argument,
not to evidence.
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This conclusion [of the Court of Appeals] fails to take account of the
consequences of inadequate notice. We hold that the deficiencies in
the public notice rendered the notice invalid . . . (9 P.3d at 766, %18)
F. Mitigation of Damages
Next, Prudential argues that damages were ended in 1979 even without reference
to the new statute § 7-17-1 et. seq. Specifically, Prudential relies upon the following
comments made by Judge Rigtrup from the bench at the close of trial:
THE COURT: You may make an offer of proof. My ruling is
still the same. My ruling is predicated upon the fact that Prudential
sent notices to all account holders saying, "We are not going to keep
your money unless you can consent to us not paying interest, and we
are not going to charge you. Or in the alternative you can take your
money."
They had an opportunity, whether by statute or by an act of
God or whatever, they got a specific notice saying that they could
take their money. And they all had an opportunity to mitigate
damages. R. 3717 at 292-93. (Ex. A hereto.)
Based on the Court's verbal comments, above, Prudential submitted a proposed
written Conclusion of Law on the mitigation. (R. 3799.) However, Madsen filed the
following objection to the proposed Conclusion of Law on mitigation:
Prudential raises the issue of mitigation for the first time.9
Mitigation is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure, 8(a). The failure to plead mitigation results
in a waiver of the defense. Pratt v. Bd ofEduc, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah
1977). Moreover, no testimony or arguments were offered on the
issue of mitigation. Finally, the issue of mitigation was not framed
in the Court's bifurcation order of September 3, 1985. . . .
9

[footnote from original] Prudential relies on some early remarks by the Court.
(Tr. 290-308.) [See Ex. A.] However, those remarks were gratuitous since there was no
issue pending and no evidence had been received on that issue.
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Mitigation is a matter on which Prudential had the burden of proof.
Having chosen not to present evidence on the issue, or argue the
point, Prudential is now foreclosed from raising the issue by way of
"findings" by the Court. Pratt v. Bd. ofEduc, supra. (R. 2665.)
Prudential opposed Madsen's objection (above) at R. 2781-2782.
Based on the foregoing arguments, the trial court refused to include anything about
mitigation in the final signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See R. 2994 3004.
POINT VIT
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
A. Ascertainable
Madsen's opening Brief argued (at p. 19-21) that the Supreme Court opinion in
Madsen I was binding on the issue of prejudgment interest. Specifically, Madsen relied
on the following language from Madsen I:
[I]t (is) of no consequence that the amount of the funds subjected to
the lien, and thus, the amount of the lien, may vary during the
existence of the pledge. The amount is ascertainable10 at any given
time, and thus the lien is perfected as to amount. (Emphasis added.)
The language from Madsen I above, ("ascertainable") follows the Utah Supreme
Court's classic test for prejudgment interest set forth in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 32
Utah 101, 88 P.1003, 1007 (1907):
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed
before judgment. . . is . .. whether the injury and consequent
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular
10

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Fifth Ed. 2002) ("ascertain: find out or
learn for a certainty").
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time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value . . . (Emphasis added.)
See also: Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, f7, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 6: "A party is
entitled to interest on past due money when both the amount due and the due date may be
ascertained." And, indeed. Judge Rigtrup has ascertained the damages in this case.
See Findings of Fact 9, 12, and 13 at R. 2999 and R. 3000. (Also Exhibit D of Madsen's
opening Brief) Thus, prejudgment interest should be awarded.
B. Prejudgment Interest on Equitable Claims
Prudential also claims that Madsen (and other class members) are not entitled to
prejudgment interest on equitable claims. (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at p.
39.) However, this is not a case where the trial court applied equity in determining the
award to Madsen. Rather, in the case at bar the amount of the award was
"ascertainable." (See subsection A above)
In the case of Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ftf, 155 P.3d 917, describes the
type of case where prejudgment interest is not allowed.
The nature of losses that cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy are those in which damage amounts are to be determined by
the broad discretion of the trier of fact, such as cases of personal
injury, wrongful death, defamation of character, and false
imprisonment.
Of course, the instant case does not fall within the above categories.
See also Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71,1 P.2d 941 (1931). (Prejudgment interest
awarded in suit for an accounting in equity.)
19

C. Marshaling
Prudential claims that Madsen has not marshaled the evidence to support
prejudgment interest. However, Madsen's argument on prejudgment interest is based on
the mandate in Madsen I that Madsen's damages are "ascertainable at any given time."
POINT VIII
COMPOUND INTEREST
Prudential cites several cases which have rejected compound interest. But see
Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39,1J47, 577 Utah Adv. Rep. 19:
Consistent with federal law, the determination of whether the
prejudgment interest should be compounded annually lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Again, the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court is Madsen I is controlling on the
issue of compounding. In Madsen /, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The pledgee has the duty to account to the pledgor for the increase or
profits accruing to the pledgee as a result of the possession of the
pledged chattel. (Emphasis added.) Madsen I at 1340.
In this case, the trial court entered Finding of Fact Tf 14 that:
The court finds it appropriate under the facts of this case to
compound on an annual basis. The court finds that Prudential must
disgorge these compounded profits to make Madsen whole.11
(Emphasis added.) R. 3000. (See Brief of Appellants at Ex. D, p. 7.)
1

' Thus, the award of compound interest was based upon a factual finding (Finding
of Fact \ 14) by the Court that Prudential must pay compound interest "in order to make
Madsen whole." However, Prudential has attempted to challenge this factual finding
without marshaling the evidence. See Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Sav. and Loan
Assn., 89 Or. App. 270, 749 P.2d 577 (1988) for an identical case in which compound
interest was awarded.
20

In summary, the trial court reached a factual conclusion that Prudential had earned
and pocketed compounded interest on the funds. Therefore, pursuant to the mandate in
Madsen /, the award of compound interest was necessary so that Madsen would receive
the "increase or profits accruing to the pledgee." (See quote from Madsen I above.)
Finally, Madsen's opening Brief cited Comment 207(2) of the Restatement of
Trusts (1959):
If the trustee uses trust funds in his own business and it does not
appear how much he has eamed thereon, he is ordinarily chargeable
with compound interest on the ground that he probably received a
return from the trust fund so used at least equal to compound interest.
Prudential's response is that the "present situation is not a trust." But, see Western
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664, 674 (1920):
Under the law, therefore, appellant was entitled to dividends that
were declared on the stock during the time it remained in pledge, and
it necessarily follows that it received such dividends as a trustee for
the benefit of the pledgor of the stock, and was bound to account for
them . . . (Emphasis added.)
POINT IX
SINGLE FAMILY PRIMARY RESIDENCE LOANS
A. Excluding Class Members based on "Guesswork."
In 1977, Judge Croft certified the class in this case to include:
[A] 11 persons who are presently parties to trust deed contracts, with
defendant wherein the contract provides that: [Prudential is holding
pledged funds.] (R. 640.) (Emphasis added.)
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Nearly twenty years later, in 1996, Judge Rigtrup narrowed the class by excluding
duplexes, triplexes, second homes (or cabins) and corporate owned homes. (R. 5522.)
The basis for Judge Rigtrup's ruling was guesswork. Judge Rigtrup guessed that:
[W]here they are either holding rental property or apartments or
commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back and
borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the
relationship with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to the
well. (R. 5523.)
On appeal, Madsen's core argument was that:
Neither Judge Rigtrup nor Prudential have ever cited a single case
which holds that a court can exclude some parties from a class on the
guess that they might not want to be part of the class. Brief of
Appellants at p. 25-26.
Prudential has now filed its Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant but Prudential
has still failed to cite a single case where a court excluded potential class members on the
guess that they may not want to be part of the class. See Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d
1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981) ("It is not 'fatal if some members of the class might prefer
not to have violation of their rights remedied.'"); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569,
575 (N.D. 111. 1992) ("A class may be certified even though the initial definition includes
members who have not been injured or do not wish to pursue their claims against the
defendant.'5); Harrington v. City of Albuquerque, 222 F.R.D. 505, 513 (D.N.M. 2004)
("Moreover, even if some class members do not share the named Plaintiffs'...
motivation for the present litigation, that is insufficient alone to defeat class
certification.")
22

B. Notice to Classmembers who are dropped from the Class
Madsen's opening Brief argues that Judge Rigtrup should have given notice to
those class members (duplex owners, triplex owners, etc.) who were dropped in 1996.
Madsen relied upon Rule 23(e) U.R.C.P.:
A class action shall not be dismissed . .. without approval of the
court and notice of the proposed dismissal. .. shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. (Emphasis
added.)
Prudential's response is that Rule 23(e) does not apply when the court drops some
classmembers.12 However, notice must be given if members are excluded because of an
amendment to the complaint or a problem with the class representative.13
But suppose Prudential's argument is correct. Suppose that the Court had no
obligation in 1996 to advise duplex and triplex owners that they were dropped from the
class. That simply means that the problem is delayed until today. See American Tierra
Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 762 (Utah 1981)
We agree with the federal interpretations and conclude as a matter of
Utah law that when a proper appeal of a class certification decision is
taken, the tolling benefit continues on behalf of all members of the
class until the class issue is finally determined by the decision on
appeal.

12

Prudential relied upon Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999); and In
re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001). However, the facts
and issues in Davoll and Integra Realty are totally different from the case at bar.
"Yqffe v.Detroit Steel Corp., 50RR.D.481 (N.D. 111. 1970) and Alexander v.
Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), respectively.
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In summary, if this court concludes that Judge Rigtrup properly dropped duplexes,
triplexes, second homes, and commercial properties in his 1996 Ruling, the statute of
limitations would have been tolled for duplexes, triplexes, etc. until the decision of this
court on appeal. That simply opens the floodgates for thousands of those duplexes and
triplex owners to file individual lawsuits after this decision is published. And, of course,
they will all win because they signed identical contracts. Thus, the courts of this state
would be backlogged and overcrowded for no good reason.
C. Amended Complaint
Prudential claims that Madsen's Substitute Third Amended Complaint (R. 975)
had the effect of excluding duplexes, triplexes, second homes and commercial properties.
First of all, it is important to note that the class description included at paragraph 5 of the
Substitute Third Amended Complaint is identical to the class originally certified by Judge
Croft in 1977. (R. 640-41.) Importantly, duplexes, triplexes, etc. were included in Judge
Croft's original class certification and duplexes, triplexes, etc. were also included in the
Sustitute Third Amended Complaint. Compare R. 976 and R. 640-41.
Second, the question of whether or how a certified class can be enlarged by an
amended pleading has been definitely resolved in Madsen III which states:
Prudential asserts that amended complaints filed by the Madsens
have added new legal theories to the case and have sought
enlargement of the plaintiff class. The result, Prudential claims, is a
plaintiff class whose boundaries are imprecise.
Notwithstanding Prudential's assertions, this case has a
precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of Prudential borrowers
24

whose trust deeds contain language identical to the Madsen's trust
deed. The class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977. . ..
While it is true that the Madsens did seek to enlarge the class,
a new plaintiff class has never been certified. Allegations
alone do not act to enlarge an existing class. (Emphasis
added.)14 Madsen III, 161 P.2d at 547.
However, if the Substitute Third Amended Complaint (R. 974) had the effect of
dropping duplexes, triplexes, etc. from the class, Culver City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908,
915 (7th Cir. 2002) is on point:
Part of any order "altering" the certification in this way should be a
provision for notice to the class members.
Of course, no notice was ever sent to duplex owners, triplex owners, and owners of
commercial properties that they had been excluded from the class.
POINT X
PRUDENTIAL HAS ATTEMPTED TO HIDE GRAVE DEFECTS
IN THE MASTER'S WORK PRODUCT
Madsen's opening Brief pointed out several problems in the Master's work
product. Those defects are summarized below.
14

Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint did include an allegation
defining "real estate loan" as a "single-family" residence. (See R. 975, f4a). However, as
stated above: "Allegations alone do not act to enlarge an existing class." (Madsen III at
547.) Furthermore, the allegations relating to "single-family residence" relate to
Plaintiffs' Claim for Statutory Damages (R. 984-86) and that Plainitiffs' Claim for
Statutory Damages is not part of this appeal. On the other hand, Plaintiffs' Claim for
Accounting and Unjust Enrichment (R. 980) includes duplexes, triplexes, commercial
properties, etc. (Compare R. 976 f5 and R. 981 1f2l(b).) Finally, plaintiffs' claims to
certify a defendant class (R. 978 ^[13) were dismissed by the trial court (R. 1950-51) and
claims for a defendant class are not part of this appeal. Thus the only defendant
remaining in the Substitute Third Amended Complaint is Prudential.
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A. Master Secretly Offered to Show Draft of Final Report to Prudential
(See Brief of Appellant at pp. 29-30)
James Loebbecke was an expert witness for Prudential. (R. 8533, 8635, 8687.) He
made the following hand written notes after an ex parte meeting with the Master:
Ed [Erickson - the Master] will draft his findings for a meeting with
attorneys. Will share with me first. (Emphasis added.) (R. 9672.)
Importantly, the Master has admitted that he presented his preliminary report to
Prudential and not to Madsen. R. 9700 -01.
The above conduct squarely violated Rule 53(e)(5) U.R.C.P. which states:
Before filing his report a Master may submit a draft thereof to
counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(Emphasis added.)
Prudential's response to the argument about ex parte meetings was that:
The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' argument that the
Special Master engaged in inappropriate ex parte meetings with
Prudential personnel, finding that the communications were fully
within the Special Master's scope of authority, were known to
Madsen and to the Court, and were required to fulfill the tasks given
by the Court to the Special Master. . . . The Special Master's
communication with Prudential personnel... was authorized by the
Court. .. (Emphasis added.) Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant
at p. 46-47.
The above comments are an absolute misrepresentation of the Record. The trial
court has made absolutely no "finding" that the special master was "authorized" to
participate in ex parte meetings with Prudential's expert witness.
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Madsen is willing to concede arguendo that there might have been circumstances
when it may have been appropriate for the Special Master to meet with bank "personnel"
to review records. But it was a huge step for the master to go beyond bank "personnel"
and meet with the "expert witness" for Prudential. It is respectfully submitted that there
was no reason and no approval for the Master to hold ex parte meetings with Prudential's
expert witness. Further, it is respectfully submitted that there was never any court
approval for the Master to meet ex parte with Prudential's expert witness.
All of the various citations to the Record (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at
p. 46) were justifications or excuses given by the Master not the Judge.
B. Sorting 70.000 Loan Original Cards
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 30-31.)
The Final Judgment was based upon data from 70,000 "loan origination cards."
But the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan origination cards. (R. 10370, 10485.)
Furthermore, the Master has: " . . . not yet performed testing to determine if all [70,000]
loan cards have been properly segregated . . . " (R. 10370.)
Prudential's Memorandum makes no defense to the grave defect discussed above.
C. Master's Claim that he had done a "Limited Amount of Testing."
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 32-33)
The original universe of 70,000 loan cards fl| B above) was narrowed down (by
Prudential - not the Master) to a "data base" of 14,482 loan cards.15 (R. 10485-6.)
15
The "data base" of 14,482 loan cards would include 14,482 persons who were
possible or probable class members because they had signed contracts similar or identical
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With respect to this "data base" of 14,482 loan cards, the Master stated:
I have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base,
primarily in obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to
plaintiff counsel's request.. . (R. 10370.) (Emphasis added.)
In response to the Master's claim that he had done a "limited amount of testing"
(above), plaintiffs expert (Certified Public Accountant, Certified Fraud Examiner, and
Certified Financial Investigator) stated:
That process of picking up and delivering cards is best described as
an "errand boy." There is absolutely no basis in the accounting
profession to label that process as "testing". .. First of all, a sample
of 50 cards from a universe of 70,000 cards is much to small a
sample to do any legitimate testing. . . . Indeed, there is no
evidence, based on the Report, that the Master even read the cards.
In summary, it was deceitful for the Master to pretend that he
had done a "limited amount of testing" when there was in reality no
statistical "testing" of any kind, based on his Report dated March 1,
2002 and the related historical record in the case. (Emphasis from
original.) (R. 12610.)
Prudential's Memorandum has not offered any evidence or argument that testing a
total of 50 loan cards from a universe of 70,000 loan cards can be statistically significant.
D. Filing 70.000 Loan Cards with the Court
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 34-36.)
Rule 53(e)(1) U.R.C.P. states in part:
The Master shall prepare a report on the matters submitted to him . ..
and . . . shall file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the
evidence and of the original exhibits. (Emphasis added.)

to the Madsen contract within the relevant time frame.
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Of course everything in the Master's Report was based upon the 70,000 loan cards,
but these 70,000 loan cards were not filed with the court. Prudential's only justification
for not filing the 70,000 loan cards was to cite the court's Order that:
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court each and
every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court.
(R. 12766.)
However, Prudential's Brief cites no rule and no case law to support the trial
court's comments above. Furthermore, Prudential's argument above (based upon the
Court's comments above) lead to an absurdity. Suppose it us true (as stated by the trial
court) that:
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court each and
every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the court.
(Emphasis added.)
Why and how can the above language be stretched to mean:
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court any
documents used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court.
(Emphasis added.)
E. Was the Master Finished?
(See Brief of Appellant at pp. 33-34.)
Madsen's opening Brief argued that it was error to enter a Final Judgment based
upon a Master's Report because the Master had admitted that "more testing would be
required." (R. 12762.) Prudential's response to the argument, above, was that:
The Special Master's reference to further testing relates to the
anticipated time when class damages will be distributed to individual
class members. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at p. 48.
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The problem is the Master never said that he would need to do further testing:
"when damages will be distributed to individual class members." What the Master really
said was:
It seemed the court's interest and intent was to obtain an estimate
. . . I concluded and still believe that the work performed was
sufficient to provide the Court with a reasonable estimate upon
which to make further decisions. (R. 12761-62) (See Ex. H to
Brief of Appellants.) (Emphasis added.)
So the questions remain: What does the Master mean by "reasonable estimate"?
What does the Master mean by "further decisions"? Certainly the Court should not enter
a Final Judgment until the "further decisions" are made.
F. Did Madsen Waive their Right to See the 70.000 Loan Cards?
(See Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at pp. 48-49, fh. 15.)
Prudential argues (in a lengthy footnote16) that Madsen was given an opportunity to
inspect the 70,000 loan cards. Specifically, Prudential made the following argument in
the trial court:
[Djuring the January 15, 2003 hearing, the Madsens' counsel
claimed that he had never had an opportunity to review all of
Prudential's loan cards. . . . Accordingly, Judge Fratto ordered that
Prudential make all of the relevant loan cards available to the
Madsens' counsel.
* * *

Having been given the opportunity to review the cards, but
declining to do so, the Madsens have waived any argument as to the
accuracy of the Special Master's conclusions. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 12358-9.)
16

Which footnote contains a quote attributed to Madsen, supported by UR. 12359."
However, that record citation is merely argument, unsupported by any testimony.
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Madsen responded to the foregoing argument in the trial court as follows:
Prudential totally overlooks the fact that shortly after the
hearing of January 15, 2003, Judge Fratto recused himself. . .. And
no order has been signed related to the January 15 hearing. Thus,
Madsens have not waived anything. . . . Presumably, Prudential will
continue to cooperate by making the 70,000 loan cards available for
review at an appropriate time. (R. 12452-3.)
Because of Madsen's argument, above, the trial court has never made any finding
or ruling that Madsens had "waived" their right to inspect the 70,000 loan cards.
POINT XI
THERE IS A SHORTCUT
(Compare Brief of Appellant p. 39-44)
Madsen's opening Brief pointed out that this case is over thirty years old.
Madsen further argued that if the case is remanded for further findings, that could add
another five to ten years to the case. Therefore, Madsen proposed that this court adopt the
"shortcut" set forth in Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan, 182
Or. 533, 557 P.2d 477 (1978). Prudential's response was that the appellate court has no
power to create such a shortcut.
But see Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941 (1931). In many ways, Simper
was identical to the case at bar. In Simper, the defendant had a duty to render an
accounting. However, the defendant made many excuses and no satisfactory accounting
was ever presented by the defendant. In the end, our Supreme Court stated.
We, however, are also of the opinion that this litigation
ought to end.
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At that point the Supreme Court took over and made its own computations to end
the case. It is respectfully submitted that this Court has the same power to end this case
by adopting the Derenco shortcut.
CONCLUSION
This Court should remand this case, instructing the trial court as set forth in the
Conclusion of Madsen's opening Brief.
NOTE ON PAGINATION
The "Special Note" appended at the end of Madsen's opening Brief (pp. 44-46)
was a provisional objection, not part of the actual Brief (no more than this note is part of
the instant brief). Hence these notes would not be included in the page limits set forth in
Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus the combination of the
opening brief (43 2/3 pages) and this brief (31 1/3 pages) do not exceed 75 pages. In the
event the Court disagrees with this calculation, Madsen respectfully moves the Court,
pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to permit the filing of
this Reply Brief even though it may exceed the page limitation found in Rule 24.
DATED this Z0~

day of

At^o^jf-

2007.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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Number

Offered

P-10,11

242

243

P-12,13

250

250

Received

-j

from 13 and you gen 1.17 hours per person s t a r t i n g w i t h

2

13; right?
A.

3

4

1.17 hours per year

per loan.
Q

5

Okay.

If m

fact it only took one employee

to do all this work, then you'd be

6
7

No, not per person.

I

13 times in error,

wouldn't you?

8

MR. PALMER:

9

THE COURT:

Sustained.

10

MR. DeBRY:

Okay.

11

MR. PALMER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. PALMER:

I object.

I have no further question's

No further questions.
You may step down.
Now, your Honor, I don't have

14

any further witnesses to call, and subject to an offer

15

of proof, and I make the offer of proof because we contend

16

that there are a number of additional issues m

17

I

j

the case

beyond the question of profit.

18 j

I'd be glad to detail those issues.

There

19

are at least 24 of them.

But to move those issues, we

20

would offer the testimony that is contained in the affidavit

21

of Edwin Calvert already in the file, the affidavit of

22

Gibbs Marsh, already on file.

23

is contained m

24

We would offer Prudential's charter,m effect until 1977,

25

called Charter K, which specifically says that Prudential

Also, the evidence that

Prudential's answers to interrogatories.
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n
is not required to pay earnings on shon-term deposits.

I

We would offer the deposition of
Arthur

Libold, or the testimony as cor:amed m

deposition of Mr. Libold.

the

The deposition of Mr. Madsen,

the documents filed by Mr. DeBry, DV plaintiff, as producec
by the Federal Home Loan Bank board, Our annual reports,
the briefs on appeal, and testimony frcn Mr. Adams, an
auditor of Prudential Federal Savings.
THE COURT:

I t n m K Libold's deposition

was puolished.
MR. PALMER:
THE COURT:

It was.
And I'm not sure of Mr. Madsen's

Was there a motion to publish that and has it been
published?
MR. PALMER:
last —

It was published before the

on the first motion for summary judgment hearing.

So it's already been published.
THE COURT:

If it's net, it is published

now7.
MR. PALMER:

Thank you.

And m

the interest

of time I ! 11 spare you argument as to v^hat I contend those
additional issues are.
THE COURT:
m

As you know, the Supreme Court

tne case of Madsen v. Prudential concluded that the

underlying loan agreement created a pledge, and if tne
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are not going to get done tomorrow.
MR. DeBRY:

Well, our witness will take,

I'm guessing, in the neighborhood of one to two hours.
I don't know what the cross-examination will be, but we
can do that quickly.
But there are some documents I would like
to get in evidence that will take some foundation.

I'm

only saying that it may not require documents because
under one theory of the case we are entitled to damage
for that period of time, and therefore, what they did
during the 1980fs is relevant.
Now, at the end of the case

—

THE COURT:

I don't know what that theory

MR. De3RY:

Let me explain it, then, because

is.

I know the Court's been troubled.

You have ruled on the

constitutional issue and I won't belabor that.

But you

ruled in an earlier time and you again ruled yesterday
that the statute was constiturional, and because of the
statute, that cut off the damages after 1979.
There is a major difference between this
case and the earlier case you heard, and that specific
difference is that this case was filed and on file before
the statute was passed.
THE COURT:

And I understand that.
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MR. DeBRY:

And the statute specifically

exempted cases before the statute.
argument.

It's not a constitution

The statute says that this statute does not

apply to lawsuits filed before July 1 of 1979.
THE COURT:
3

V i i

UcJ-XCOU

My rationale is that
i. i W L-J- W- C.

represent him in this case.

W J-

LJlC

i

L D L U U C

.

You appeared before the commit!

of the legislature, as I understand it, or were deeply
involved in it, number one.
Two, he received specific notice, which
I think you agreed to, from Prudential saying that "We
are no longer going to maintain escrows, and if you want
us to do it, we'll do it at no cost to you and no interest
to you.

If you don't like that, take your money."
And on the basis of mitigation of damages,

that's sufficient to convince me that the statutory scheme
applies to him and he had an obligation to mitigate, and
he didn't do that.
He didn't take his money.

And if he chooses

to leave it there on the theory that the damages keep
accruing against the defendant, just on general mitigation
theories, I don't buy off on it.
MR. DeBRY:

That rationale works with respec

to everybody that didn't have a lawsuit pending.

But

the statute specifically says that the provisions of
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1

this acr snail apply 10 all actions filed after F e b r u a r y

2

of 1979.

3

to m a K e a record here.

4

"We d o n ' t owe money after July 1 of 197 9.

5

we don't owe money afrer July 1 of 1979 is because of

So let me follow the way it w o r k s , at
Prudential comes m

1

least

a^d they
And the

say,

reason

»

this statute, 7-17-4 , w m c h says we can send out a notice.",
7 |
8

I

9
10
11

N o w , the notice isn't in the

courtroom,

can't be used because this doesn't apply to this lawsuit. J
Now, the legislature specifically said that m i s lawsuit

'

can keep going witnout regard to the staiuxe.
Now, maybe you want to rule now, or not,

12

but at leasr under m a t tneory we are entitled to a proffer

13

of proof with respect to trie inclusive period of 19BO.

14

THE COURT:

Yoa may make an offer of proof.

15

My ruling is still tne same.

My ruling is predicated

16

upon the fact that Prudential sent notices to all account

17 I

h o l d e r s saying,

18

you can consent to us not paying i n t e r e s t , and w e

19

not going to charge you.

20 J

take your m o n e y . "

"We are not going to k e e p your m o n e y unless!

Or m

are

the alternative you can

They had an o p p o r t u n i t y , w h e t h e r by

statute

22 (

or by an act of God or w h a t e v e r , tney got a s p e c i f i c

23 |

saying tnat tney could take tneir m o n e y .

24 I

had an opportunity

25

to mitigate

And they

notice

all

damages

A n d based on t h a t n o t i o n , t h e n the

Court

i
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is concluding that they can*t simply sit there, having
been given the opportuni ty to mitigate damages, notwithst
the earlier filing of a lawsuit, and let the car-ages run.
They, as a matter of common law, must mitigate damages.
i

And on that. notion, and that notion alone, I so rule.
MR. DeBRY:

Okay.

I don't want to quibble

with the Court, but just to be sure we have the record
correct

—
MR. PALMER :

Is this opening starement,

or is this argument, or —
MR. DeBRY:
MR. PALMER :

He's making a ruling.
It sounds very repetitious

to what the Court has ru led on 14 times, or Ion g before
trial, and Counsel keeps saying he doesn't want to argue
with the Court and then proceeds to do that.
THE COURT:
constitutionality.

I have ruled on the

The statute is constitution al.

The

notices are sufficient to place all account hoi ders on
notice that they can take their money and go, a nc that's
sufficient that they mus t mitigate their damages.
Now, let's talk about the limitat ions prob.
on the front end, and le t me rule on that.

And we'll

decide the scope of the rest of the trial.
MR. DeBRY:
record,

I need 30 seconds to make a

I think the Cou rt is very firm.

Our position i

2S

1

that the reason the notice was not s u f f i c i e n t or

2

is because they didn't tell the whole s t o r y .

3

what they didn't tell is they were earning

4

they revealed that, M r . Macsen and other p e o p l e

5

have made a different

5 j

adequate

P a r t of

a profit.

Had

might

choice.

I would like to call M r . A d a m s

to the

stand,

please.

7

THE C O U R T :
about p r e j u d i c e .

9

The Supreme C o u r t case

talks

It doesn't talk about c o n t r a c t .

And

10

you take the approach that they had a c o n t r a c t that was

11

struck before the statute was enacted and

12

The legislature

13

Court simply said by contractual d e f i n i t i o n it

14

a pledge..

1B

c a n T t impair c o n t r a c t s , b u t t h e

I

Supreme
created

There's no language in there a b o u t p a y i n g or

not p a y i n g , because the contract created

15

constitutional.

a common

law

pledge.

17

Then it says that if the p l e d g e e

T8

p r o f i t , then the pledgor is entitled to an

19

and a d i s g o r g e m e n t of the p r o f i t s ,

20 I

earns a

accounting

And along those lines of a p l e d g e obligation

21

not contract —

there w a s a reasonable n o t i c e

22

sufficient to place them on notice that he d i d n ' t

23

to leave h i s pledge property w i t h them, and he could

24

it.

25

the running of the additional profits or

j

given

And I think that's sufficient in all c a s e s to

have
take

terminate

interest.
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MR. DeBRY:

1

You have been very patient to

I am prepared on contract, and this

2

hear the argument

3

argument is a lit tie diff erent.

4

The contr act itself, but due process, whether or not the

5

notice th ey sent, if it!s not full disclosure, is enough

6

1
j

4- r\
v~-w

THE COURT:

7
8

Mr. DeBry in this case.

9

the legis lature.

10

It was on file.

You art iculated it.

You were before

You articulated

Mr. Madsen can't claim ignorance or anythin
of t he kind.

He' s our test case.
MR. DeBRY:

13
14

Mr. Madsen was represented by

it i n the media, in artic les.

11
12

It's not impairment.

It may be different with respec

to c ther class members.
THE COURT:

15

Well, I'm not to that bridge

16

yet.

17

when he ! s entitled to a p rofit, on the front end, and

18

let' s dispose of that?

19
20
21

Do you want to talk about the limitations as to

MR. DeBRY:

Maybe we can just move througr

the witnesses qui ckly and do those at the end.
THE COURT.:

You made a demand for a jury

22

tria 1, an d Mr. PaImer fil ed an objection and requested

23

that the demand b e stricken.

24

you predi cated a demand f or possible entitlement to a

25

jury was the statute of 1 imitations problem.

And the only issue on whi

And I hav

1

ruled with r e s p e c t to the limitation on the tail

end,

2

and there is still the problem of the issue w i t h

respect

3

to when the clock starts running on the

4
5

MR. D e B R Y ;

front end.

We are r e a d y to argue that

n o w , if that would be h e l p f u l .

5

Your H o n o r , with respect to the

statute

7

of limitations on the front end, I refer the Court

8

Section

9

7 8 - 1 2 - 3 4 , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d , which says

there is no statute of limitations at all with

10

to actions b r o u g h t to recover money or other

11

deposited w i t h any b a n k , trust a s s o c i a t i o n or

12

and loan.

M a d s e n put money in in

!

to
that

respect

property
savings

64.

Let's assume our theory of the c a s e .

13

Let's

14

assume that they kept the money w r o n g f u l l y , they

15

a p r o f i t , e v e n if that profit is $ 1 , and they d i d n ! t

16

the m o n e y to him.

17 I

earned

Eventually they give the m o n e y to t h e

18

a u t h o r i t i e s , but w h a t remained left over is 100 per

19

profit.

20 J

then

Is that a deposit?

give

tax
cent

If it's a d e p o s i t ,

We think t h a t it's a deposit is

the

21

statute a p p l i e s .

22 I

as a bill b e c a u s e of a number of r e a s o n s .

23

the d i c t i o n a r y , but m o s t important is that the f e d e r a l

24 |

regulation applied to banks s a y s ,

25 i

by the d e p o s i t o r y

institution

We h a v e

"Money received

or the e q u i v a l e n t

clear
cited

or

i

held

given
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i ]

for m o n e y or its e q u i v a l e n t received or h e l d by the

2 |

d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n in the u s u a l course o f b u s i n e s s

3 |

for a special or specific p u r p o s e , r e g a r d l e s s of legal

4 |

r e l a t i o n s h i p established thereby, including e s c r o w funds

5 |

it s p e c i f i c a l l y says escrow funds is a d e p o s i t .

6 j

And you save the c o u r t t i m e , w i t h o u t going

7

through the a d d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s , but the d i c t i o n a r y

8

says that a p l e d g e is a p r o f i t .

9
10

So we t h i n k there is

no statute of limitations at a l l .
If there is a s t a t u t e , w e t h i n k t h e r e is

1«I

a d i s c o v e r y rule that a p p l i e s , and we rely on The C o m m e r

12

Bank v. Spanish Fork South I r r i g a t i o n C o m p a n y . .

13

a copy of that to the Court y e s t e r d a y .

14

in a p l e d g e case the Court said, " F u r t h e r m o r e —

15

said t h a t in a p l e d g e c a s e , "it is o u r v i e w t h a t the

16

a p p l i c a b l e statute of limitations w o u l d n o t b e g i n to run

17

on this action u n t i l the i n f i r m i t y in the

18

was d i s c o v e r e d , or by reasonable d i l i g e n c e could h a v e

19

been d i s c o v e r e d . "

20

But

W e gave

specifically
" they

certificate

We also read to the C o u r t the o t h e r day

21

from C o r p u s Juris Secundum under p l e d g e s , and the citati

22

is in the record.

23

you d o n f t have an action —

24

d o e s n ' t start to run on a p l e d g e " u n t i l y o u k n o w the plec

25

has been m i s u s e d .

It says e x a c t l y t h a t .

It says t h a t

the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s

N o w , I think t h e C o u r t is f a m i l i a r

2!

1

with that background, and I think the Court is bothered

2

or concerned by the fact that Mr. Madsen may have been

3

I

unhappy or grumbled about the arrangement

4
5

THE COURT:
I

6
7

unhappy.

No.

No.

I didn't like it either.

1 grumbled.

I was

I'm not singling

Mr. Madsen out.
)

MR. DeBRY:

Let me simply say that it doesn't

8 I

matter if you're unhappy, if you're grumbling.

9

even matter if you think it's unfair.

It doesn't '

The statute doesn't

10

begin to run until you have a knowledge, until you discover

11

that they are earning a profit on it.

12

theyfve

earned a profit on it, until then it can't begin

13 |

to run.

We filed a supplemental trial brief, your Honor,

14

and there's one additional theory the Court ought to be

15 |

aware of.

IS I

v. United Shoe.

17

|

have a copy here for the Court

18

1

19

I

When you learn

That is the famous antitrust case, Hanover Shoe
It's in our supplemental brief, but we

The idea is that if it's a wrongful business
practice

and a continuing business practice —

here we

20

have the same practice year after year -- the statute

21

doesn't begin to run on that continuing business practice.

22

You go back to the beginning of the business practice.

23

It's not told every time you make a check.

24

to be correct law certainly with respect to antitrust,

25

because this is the United States Suoreme Court.

And that seems

And
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it's a little bit like what happens, your Honor, with
the doctors and malpractice.

The statute is really told.

The statute doesn't start to run.
you discover a medical malpractice.

It's not so much when
Well, there's

good

Utah case that escapes me now, but as long as you're going
to the same doctor

it doesn't start to run.

As long as you're dealing with the same
underlying business practice, it's just a recurrent'
..cyclical business practice.

It doesn't really start to

run.
Mr. Norman testified and he showed us all
these nice boxes, 20 or 30 boxes.

It's a year-round box.

where in that box do you make the marks and say that it
starts to run there?

It's just a cyclical event that

keeps going on and going on.

Therefore, it doesn't start

to run at all with respect to a repeated business violatic
Thank you.
THE COURT:
MR. PALMER:

Mr. Palmer?
Your Honor, first of all, with

respect to the statute, 78-12-34, it's one that was
repealed in 1981.

Two, it says it applies to actions

brought to recover money or other property deposited wit!"
the savings and loan.

This isn't an action to recover

a deposit by any means.
The purpose of the deposit was to pay taxe;

29

and i n s u r a n c e , and that's what's been done w i t h it.
we not d o n e that, that statute would have been
But that isn't what this case is about.
4

Had

applicable

This is an

actiion

to recover the profits claimed to have been unjustly
on t h a t .

received

So it isn't an action to recover d e p o s i t s at

;
s
;

all.
Second, this money isn't a d e p o s i t .
8
9

cite K r o n i s h v. Howard Savings Bank, 392At.2d at pace

;

1 8 2 , where

!

12

15
16
17 I

"In our

view

the tax p a y m e n t s herein are not deposits at a l l , e i t h e r
general or

special."
A c c o r d i n g to W e b s t e r ' s Third

13
14

that e x a c t claim was m a d e .
•On page 182 the court said,

10
11

We

International

D i c t i o n a r y , a deposit may be defined as m o n e y that
deposited

is

in a bank or with a banker that is subject

order.
Here it is m a n i f e s t that unlike a t r a d i t i o n a l

18

d e p o s i t , the advance tax payments made by p l a i n t i f f s

19

not in any degree

20

that u n l i k e a t r a d i t i o n a l d e p o s i t , the advance tax

21

made by p l a i n t i f f s

22

subject to order.

are

Here it is m a n i f e s t

are not in any degree

payments

subject to

And then the court cites other cases

23

that these are not deposits in any r e s p e c t .

24

that case up to the bench.

25

to

order
holding

So I'll

pass

Third, Charter K, under w h i c h we o p e r a t e ,
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and which is now relevant and which is offered in the
affidavit of Gibb Marsh, said that over the period of
time up until 1977 that we, Prudential, were not required
to pay interest on short-term deposits, or "pay earnings
on short-term deposits," to quote it exactly.
And these deposits, by federal regulation
which we've already quoted to you, were defined as shortterm deposits.

So even if they were to be called deposits,

then our regulation says that we don't —

or our charter —

plaintiff is a member of the organization and it's bound
to know the charter -- says that we can't distribute earnir
on short-term deposits.

So they cannot rely on these

as being deposits, cr they'll have no cause of action
at all, let alone a limitations problem.
Furthermore, Regulation Q now in effect
and in effect over this since 1977 specifically provides
no interest can be paid on deposits by federal savings
and loan associations.
So if you were going to call them deposits,
they don't recover.

The claim that limitations wouldn't

run until discovery can be sustained under Utah law only
in a fraud case.

The cases that —

the Utah cases that

have been cited to you are fraud cases.
to you yesterday afternoon.

I handed those

There isn't a single case

on this kind of a cuestion that extends limitations.
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To drag in the Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe case, a federal

2

case, is ridiculous.

3

there is applied a federal tolling principle.

4

in security law and antitrust law, that even though

5

state statute of limitations apply, under federal law

5 ]

IT: doesn't begin to run until there is discovery, until

7

I

10

It applies
the

they knew or should have known, to be more accurate.
But that federal tolling lav; does not apply

8
9

In rights created by federal law

to Utah law.

And there isn't a case at all in Utah that

would so say.
The Hanover Shoe case recognizes a continuing

11
12

illegal business practice.

Their practice here wasn't

13

illegal, whatever-

14

to —

15

that we just handed to the Court yesterday morning?

We have cited to you in our motion

no, there's one other brief.

Where's the brief

We have cited to you the restatement on

16
17

I can't find it.

18

or on the restatement —

—

It's either the restatement on securities
well, here it is,

The Utah Code indicates that unless otherwise

19
2o

agreed, fungible collateral may be commingled.

Now, that's

21

this case.

22

it.

23

the money in the first instance when he sent us one check.

24

And this is not an illegal business practice.

25

against the law to commingle the money in any respect,

This is codified by statute, so we may commingle

That was authorized.

After all, Mr. Madsen commingled

It wasn't
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1

So that kind of doctrine doesn't extend the period of

2

limitations.

3

period of limitations.

Instead, what I think applies is the four-ye^

This statute was filed in February of 1975.

4
5

You go back four years to measure it.

I began to think

6

it was the three-year statute of limitations for detaining

7

personal property, but I don't think that's really applicab!

8

I think that it's —

9

and it certainly is not a written contract claim.

this is not a contract claim at all,
It

10

comes under the four-year limitation, paragraph B, the

11

four-year factor should be applied by law.

12

the applicable period of limitations on the back side.

13

I submit it.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. PALMER:

And that's

Mr. De3ry?
Oh, that's the application

16

in Duranco, too.

Even the Duranco case applied their

17

six-year limitation rather than open-end it forever, and

18

it rejected the deposit claim and the trust claim this

19

plaintiff here asserts.
MR. De3RY:

20

They didn't reject the deposit

21

claim, but in The Bank of America case they said -- there

22

are also two oiher cases —

23

of limitations whatsoever for the very reasons I've talked

24

about.

25

MR. PALMER:

said there was no statute

I object to the citation of
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The Bank of America case.

2

Counsel says that he read in The Wall Street Journal that

3

it was settled, that's not a final judgment.

4

been appealed and settled.
MR. DeBRY:

5

That case is appealed and albeit

It hasn't

He can take a precedent.

The

6

decision in The Bank of America was that there's no statute

7 I

of limitations because of the continuing wrongful conduct.

8

And because there was no way he could have known about

9

10

'it, there was no way he could know specifically that they
were earning a profit.
With respect to the six years, whether it

11
12

is two, three, four, five, or six, if we get down to years,

13

we don't have to file a counterclaim, we don't have to

14

say we are suing for breach of contract, though certainly

15

this is in the nature of that.

16

instrument.

17

if you're suing on a written instrument.

18

were made, all the obligations were incurred, and everything

19

was done based on that written instrument.

20
21
22

We are suing on a written

That's what the six-year statute says, that
All these payments

Were there no written instrument, none of
this would have happened.
Now, there was one thing I neglected to

23

state, and that is

54 Corpus Juris Secundum limitations

24

of actions says that whether it's a deposit or not a deposit

25

say the bank has money, the statute of limitations does
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not begin to run until payment is demanded and refused.
And we cite in our brief three cases.
i

And finally, 1 note to the Court the Utah
\

Code 68-3-2 which indicates that Utah statutes are to

be liberally construed with the view to effect the object ;
I
of the statute and promote justice.
I

i
If I could just show the Court this footnote
in the Hanover case and the tort theory case
THE COURT:
demand is granted.

—

The motion to strike the jury

The request for jury trial is denied.

The Court applies on the front end this section of the
code found in Section 78-12-25, Subparagraph 2.

This

is an action for relief not otherwise provided by law.
The four-year limitation is applicable.
The Court takes judicial notice that the action was filed
March 3, 1975 and fixes the limitation period from
March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979.

The case relied

on by plaintiff in
MR. PALMER:

Excuse me, your Honor.

I think

the Court -- on that end it's either June 3, 1975, which
is the date of the promulgation of the federal regulations
or it's July 1, '79.
of the state statute.

That's the date of the promulgation
You said June 30, '79.

THE COURT:

June 30.

We're quibbling about j

whether it's July 1 or June 30.
;05

•j

MR. DeBRY:

And what's the front end?

2

THE COURT:

March 3, 1971 through June 30,

197 9.

3

The Commercial Bank case that you rely on, the

4

|

Utah case, which is the only Utah case you've given me,

5

I

is specifically a case of concealment.

6

|

where the guy filed an affidavit with the company that

It was a case

7

he lost his certificate, when he had not.

He sold the

8

certificate to a purchaser and then through fraud and

Q

deceit and concealment obtained a new certificate, and
then utilized the new certificate to obtain loans or whateve

10

And that's a case where discovery is important.

11

Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association

12
13

is an association, and I'm not sure exactly what all that

14

means, but by depositing funds with it you become an

15

association member.

16

or the articles make him a member by being -a borrower

17

or not.

18

19
20
21

I

MR

I don't know whether the by-laws

- PALMER:

They do

THE COURT:

Do you have to be a member of

the association to borrow?
MR. PALMER:

I'm not sure which comes first,

22

but they both —once you do one, you're the other.

23

you become a member you have the right to borrow.

24
25

THE COURT:

And I'm not sure that —

Once

I'm

sure on this, but I'm assuming that as a member, just
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following general corporate principles, you are entitled
Mr. Madsen, to examine business records and books and
obtain profit and loss statements and inquire into that.

|

It's clear that when you entered the contract'

i
in question you got a copy of the contract, you had an
opportunity to read it before you signed it.
made no provision about interest specifically.

'

The contract
You knew

or should have known about the interest provisions.
And with reasonable certainty it appears to the Court
that you could have as well ascertained the financial
circumstances if profits or interest was of any concern
to you.
Since you entered your trust deed agreement
on September 24, 1964 and did nothing about it until the
filing of the complaint in this case on March 3, 1975,
I don't see any basis for the Court reaching any conclusion
that discovery has any relevance or application in this
case at all, thus justifying you to trial by jury.
an equitable case.

It's

It's an action in accounting, and

in such matters trial by jury is not a matter of right.
There was one additional thought I had.
With respect to the construction of the statutes in terms
of liberal interpretation, I think the fact is that the
rule about statutory interpretation is that courts are
bound to give statutes their plain, direct meaning.

It
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•j

wasn't a deposit in this .case.

It was a security pledge

2

made according to the contract by the mortgagor,

3

I guess it was a trust deed in this case, as a condition

4 j

of the contract for a specific purpose, namely to pay

5

taxes and insurance.

and

6
7

I

it, or them unlawfully withholding the property, as

8

j

Mr. Palmer has conceded.

9

I

it the evidence is, that Prudential Federal simply paid

At the end of the year, I take

10

the taxes, paid the insurance

as was contemplated by

11

the contract, didn't withhold his monkey, and there wasn't

12

any demand element of it.

He couldn't get the money back.

And based thereon, the language contained

13
14

in the language provision, the Court concludes, has no

15

application and it is simply an action for profits, if

16

any, derived on the pledge.
And I can find nothing, and I went back

17
18 I
19

J

through all the limitations provisions —

p r o v i s i o n , unless otherwise provided by law or n o t

20'

provided by law, and as to that there is a

21

limitation.

22
23
24

other than the

MR- D e B R Y :

We are ready

THE C O U R T :

You may

otherwise

four-year

to call o u r

first

w*itness.
proceed.

25
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wifef for themselves and all others similarly situated,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 226073
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself
and all others similarly
situated,
Defendant.
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION.

(Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup)

On its own motion, the Court called for a hearing on
the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in this case (dated
January 14, 1977).
The hearing was held on April 12, 1985, at 2:00 p.m.
Madsen was represented by Robert J. DeBry.
represented by Joseph J. Palmer.

Prudential was

Peter Billings, Sr.

represented amicus curiae (the Utah Bankers Association).

Each

of the parties submitted a memorandum.
In addition to the pleadings herein, defendant relied
upon:

p r o fv o o

(a)

The briefs of the parties on prior appeal to the

Utah Supreme Court.
(b)

Affidavit of R. Gibb Marsh.

(c)

Affidavit of Hayden Calvert.

(d)

"Study of the Feasibility of Escrow Accounts on

Residential Mortgages Becoming Interest Bearing,"

Comptroller

General of the United States, 1973 and other documents
furnished by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to plaintiffs,
and filed herein by plaintiffs.
(e)

Deposition of Richard Madsen.

(f)

Deposition of Arthur Liebold, Jr. and four

Federal Home Loan Bank Board opinion letters attached
thereto.
(g)

Prudential's Answers to Interrogatories.

After considering the memoranda and other documents,
and the arguments of counsel, it is ORDERED that:
1.

The trust deed contract between Madsen and

Prudential is clear and unambiguous so that parole evidence may
not be considered in construing the instrument; and this Court
may therefore construe the instrument as a matter of law.
2.

The "budget payments," paid by Madsen pursuant to

the trust deed, constitute a common law pledge.

Defendant will

not be permitted to offer evidence on the following issues:
(a)

whether the parties intended profits to be paid

or whether, considering all circumstances, including their
conduct, the benefit Madsens received, and the industry
custom and practice, they intended a special agreement
that compensation or interest not be paid;

0 H 0 0 °> (

(b)

whether the parties intended a true pledge

relationship or a debtor-creditor relationship;
(c)

whether the reserve funds are pledged property or

a co-mingled, fungible cash deposit;
(d)

whether Prudential was unjustly enriched by use

of the reserve funds;
(e)

whether payment of compensation on the Madsensf

reserve funds has been preempted by federal law and
regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a
matter of fact and of law, since 1964 and all subsequent
times;
(f)

whether the Madsens have waived their claim, or

they are barred by estoppel or laches from asserting it.
3.

This matter shall proceed to a trial for the

purpose of determining whether Prudential has earned any profit
from the use of the Madsen's pledged funds, and if so, for an
accounting of those profits.

V*»f

DATED this

1

.3.V
'
idl

->

o/v^

'
Approved as to form:

Robert J. DeBry
Approved as y£5"yform:

day of

—

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

....
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup

